In a first experiment, subjects verbalizing the stream of consciousness for a 5-min period were asked to try not to think of a white bear, but to ring a bell in case they did. As indicated both by mentions and by bell rings, they were unable to suppress the thought as instructed. On being asked after this suppression task to think about the white bear for a 5-min period, these subjects sh~ significantly more tokens of thought about the bear than did subjects who were asked to think about a white bear from the outset. These observations suggest that attempted thought suppression has paradoxical etfects as a self-control strategy, perhaps even producing the very o~on or preoccupation that it is directed against. A second experiment replicated these findings and sh~ that subjects given a specific thought to use as a distractcr during suppression were less likely to exhibit later preoccupation with the thought to be suppressed.
Trinity University
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Consciousness cannot produce a negation except in the form of the most vexing problem of thought suppression: the self-referconsciousness of negation.
ent quality of the plan to suppress. To suppress a thought reSanre, Being and Nothingness (1956, p. 43) quires that one (a) plan to suppress a thought and (b) carry out that plan by suppressing all manifestations of the thought, inIt is sometimes tempting to wish one's thoughts away. Uncluding the original plan. Thought suppression thus seems to pleasant thoughts, ideas that are inappropriate to the moment, entail a state of knowing and not knowing at once. Freud ( 1915/ or images that may instigate unwanted behaviors each can be-1957) made this strange dissociated state theoretically possible come the focus of a desire for avoidance. Whether one is trying by postulating the unconscious and by further specifying that not to think of a traumatic event, however, or is merely attemptthe unconscious was capable of performing the thought suping to avoid the thought of food while on a diet, it seems that pression for consciousness. So, although the unconscious could thought suppression is not easy. It is said, for instance, that not remove the thought from itself, and consciousness also when the young Dostoyevski challenged his brother not to think could not remove the thought from itself, the unconscious could of a white bear, the child was perplexed for a long while. Conperform this housecleaning for the separate, conscious part of temporary psychology has not focused much inquiry on such the mind. puzzling yet important phenomena, and our research was de-
The psychoanalytic emphasis on such unconscious repressigned to initiate such investigation.
sion has resulted in a longstanding bias against the examination of consciousness during processes of thought suppression. The Problem of Thought Suppression Rather, the process of suppression has been expected to be observable only after the fact, leaving its mark on memory. Thus. The idea that people may have unwanted thoughts was one of even contemporary research investigates directed forgetting Freud's fundamental insights. and his notion that people re-(e.g., Geiselman, Bjork, & FlShman, 1983) and posthypnotic press such thoughts has long served as a theoretical rallying amnesia (e.g., Kihlstrom, 1983 ) rather than directed inattenpoint in the study of psychopathology (Erdelyi & Goldberg, tion or directed conscious avoidance. These lines of investiga-1979; Hart, 1934) . Still, classical psychoanalytic theory skirts tion do not attempt to explain how or with what effect people go about the conscious task of suppressing a thought. Yet there are multiple instances in everyday life when this is precisely , what people try to do. Trying not to think about an upcoming We thank Oaudia Se:ran°' Susan Sh~ckelford, DebbIe S~~ and stressful event, avoiding thoughts of smoking while trying to Sharon Thoms for help In conducting this research, and -r:°rn GI~I~O, quit, or putting persistent thoughts of a lost love out of mind Paul Paulus, James ~. Pennebaker, Thomas Pyszczynski. Although the evidence is sketchy, there is some indication from food or addictive substances. Given the assumption that that the ~k of conscious thought suppression can be di.fficult.
the attempt to avoid a habitual behavior is commonly preceded y ~dies by McGranahan (1940) and.Sears and Virshup by attempts to suppress or avoid habit-related thoughts, the pat-(C1t~ m Sears, 194~) ~howed m.at ~le instructed to avoid tern of behavior following self-control attempts is informative making ~lo~ assoCIattOns to StImulus words often reported about the pattern of thinking that may take place. In the case of such ~atlons nonetheless, even when threatened with shock. abstinence from food. for instance, Polivy and Herman (1985) for doing so. In ~ cases, of course. ~le did not know in indicated that dieting generally causes subsequent overeating. advance the specific thought they were to suppress. only the genThey cite several converging sources of evidence suggesting that eral category of colors. More recently, Logan (1983) examined the restraint of eating is a reliable precursor of binge eating and patterns of reaction time to st~ signals given as subjects peroverweight. It seems, then, that the attempt to avoid thoughts formed brief tasks, and found that although actions can be of food may lead to a later preoccupation with such thoughts. st~ped in midcourse, thoughts seem to run to their conclusion
The more general abstinence-violation effect observed by Maras long as the stimuli activating them are present. ConSistent Ian and Parks (1982) suggests that the State of abstinence is a with this, but only broadly relevant, are the outcome studies of precarious one, in that relapse to an addictive behavior can be the thoUght-st~ping therapy technique. This therapy, suggested trigg&:red by a single, seemingly minor violation of the prohibiby Wolpe and I...aza.rus (1966) for obsessional disorders, appears tion. This, too, is consistent with the idea that an initial attempt generally no more successful than no intervention at all (Reed, to suppress thoughts can be followed by an unusual preoccupa-1985) .
tion with the suppressed thought domain. Their observation Another line of evidence arises in research that calls for peasuggests further that the event that serves to halt suppression pIe to ignore information that is relevant to a judgment they and trigger relapse may be only a single occurrence that draws must make. Whether ~le are instructed to ignore the inforthe person's attention to the originally suppressed thought. mation before they encounter it (e.g., Wegner, Coulton, & The tentative conclusions suggested by past findings are two- Wenzlaff, 1985) or are told to disregard it afterwards (e.g., Ross, fold. First, it seems that thought suppression is difficult for pea- Lepper, & Hubbard. 1975) , they tend to incorporate it into subpIe to do; the conscious avoidance of a thought may be perplexsequent judgments nonetheless. Jurors are influenced by inforing and even time consuming. Second. there is some evidence mati on they have been instructed to disregard (Thompson, to suggest that even when thoughts can be suppressed, they may Fong, & Rosenhan, 1981) , media audiences are influenced by return to consciousness with minimal prompting, perhaps to news they are told is untrue (Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker. & Beat- become obsessive preoccupations. These general expectations tie, 1981), and people judging odds are influenced by informawere explored here in two experiments through the expedient tion even when they have been offered money to ignore it (Tverof asking people to s;lppress a thought while they delivered sky & Kahneman, 1974). These effects would seem unlikely if stream-of-consciousness reports in a laboratory setting. le could will away their conscious experience of the thoughts they were instructed to ignore (cf. Sherman & CoTty, . 1984 (Janis, 1958) showed that individuals who are personally inTheinstructions~adaptcdfromthoseuscdby~(1978)andc lined to avoid thinking about an upcoming surgery subsefashioned to encourage continuous verbalization. The instructions quently exhibit more anxious reactions to it. Although the asked only for subjects to describe what they ~ thinking; there was meaning of this finding still is in debate (e.g., Janis, 1983; Laza- no special appeal for the subject to explain or justify the thought (cf.
rus, 1983), there is a degree of theoretical unanimity in the con- Ericcson & Simon, 1984) . . clusion that avoiding a stressful thought can lead to subsequent
The participant then was asked and gave Informed con~t to ~d intrusions of that thought (e.g., Horowitz, 1975 quent ex~on period. This value, r(17) = -.10, was not significantly different from zero but was significantly smaller than the .55 value observed in the other condition (p < .01). In the bear. Every time you say "white !Jear" or have "white !Jear" come i~tiaI suppression group, then, success at the initial suppresto mind, though. please ring the bell on the table before you.
Slon task created a readiness for later expression, one that sig-
.nificantly attenuated the more usual tendency for ~le who FollOWIng this, these participants were given expression instructions for express their thoughts at one time to express them at another. a ~ubsequent .perlod; they ~ asked for an additional 5 min to "try to A further indication of the rebound effect was observed in think of a white ~" Their task description was otherwise identical to the cowse of thought occurrences over the 5-min periods. This the ~ In that they ~ asked to continue ringing the bell to indicate . each instance of the thought. The participants ~gned to the initial pheno~enon was encountered when a ~YSIS o~ ~e tapes, exp~on group ~ given these instructions in ~ ord~ they by I-~n segm.ents. ~ made for ~otal bell nngs. (~ datã asked in the initial period to try to think of a white bear and in the for this analYSIS resulting from slightly short final I-lDln segsubsequent period to try not to think of a white bear.
ments for 6 subjects, 3 in each group, were replaced by each subject's total for the prior I-min segment.) As shown in Figure  Results I, bell rings per tninute increased over time during the expression period in the initial suppression group. This would be unAnalysis of the tape recordings was made for (a) bell rings remarkable except that bell rings per minute decreased over occurring simultaneously with audible mentions of "white time in every other measurement period: in the initial expresbear." (b) bell rings occurring alone, and (c) mentions occurring sion group for both expression and suppression periods and in alone. Intercoder reliability between a pair of coders averaged the initial suppression group for the suppression period. .94 over the three measures. Table I shows the means for each A 2 (initial instruction group) X 2 (period) x 5 (I-min segmeasure by condition. ment) ANOV A on square root transfonned total bell rings indi-A 2 (initial suppression vs. initial expression group) x 2 (supcated that this trend interaction was reliable. There was a sigpression period vs. expression period) X 3 (thought measure) nificant three-way interaction of group, period. and linear oranalySis of variance (ANOV A) was conducted on transfonned thogonal polynomial trend over time segments. F( I, 31) = 7.02, thought token scores. A square root transformation was made p < .02. Participants who were allowed to express a thought they to achieve homogeneity of error variance in this analysis (Kirk. had recently suppressed devel~ an accelerating tendency to 1968, pp. 63-65), but for clarity, the reported means are not report the thought. overcotning the more usual progressive illstransfonned.
interest or fatigue displayed by participants in other periods. Tokens of thought were more prevalent in the expression pc-
The stream-of-<:onsciousness protocols revealed some interriods than in the suppression periods. The mean of the summed esting facets of the thought-suppression process that are not evithought measures during expression was 19.22, and this was dent in the counting of thought tokens. The protocols made it significantly greater than the suppression mean of 6.78, F(I, clear. for example, that many of the subjects saw the thought-32) = 41.0 I, p < .000 I. Despite this difference, it is noteworthy suppression task as difficult or puzzling from the outset. Many that suppression was never complete. Participants indicated also verbalized a strategy soon after encountering the task. saythinking about a white bear (through a bell ring. mention, or ing to themselves. in effect, "Okay, so I'll think of something both) more than once per tninute even when directly instruCted else:' Perhaps most interesting. then, was the manner in which to try not to think of a white bear.
thoughts of the white bear returned to subjects when they were Tokens of thought were more frequent in the expression pereciting their various replacements for the thought. White-bear riod following initial suppression than in the initial expression mentions and bell rings almost invariably occurred. when the period. A significant interaction of initial instruction and pesubject had finished a sentence or a thought and was silent. Durriod. F(l, 32) = 4.79, P < .05, was comprised of a significant ingsuppression, subjects were generally able to keep from simple main effect of initial instruction group in the expression thinking about the tar&et thought. or at least ':"'e.re able to keep period. F(I, 32) = 5.05, p < .05. A sitnilar effect was not obfrom reporting it. as long as they were v~aIizi~ the thought served in the suppression period following initial expression, of something else. These sorts of thou.ght In~ons were not F( I, 32) < I, indicating an unusual asymmetry: Initial supprescommon, however, during the expressIon penods.. Here, men- The paradox.ical effect of thought suppression is that it pro-4.0 du~ a preoccupation with tlte suppressed tltought. These fi~dings su~ that the task of suppressing a tltoUght is itself difficult. leading ~Ie to hold the thought in consciousn~ repeatedly even as they try to eliminate it. When they are theñ 3,0 released from the supp~on task and asked instead to gõ ahead and express the thought. they do so at an accelerated rate ffi mentioning it more often than if they had simply been asked ~ express the thought from the start. There are thus both immedi-~ORE ate and delayed tendencies toward conscious preoccupation cr 2.0 with the very thought that is being suppressed.
Potential explanations for these two effects can be derived from several psychological theories. It may be possible to 3-wmilate these findings to the theory of psychological reactance (Brehm. 1966)0 Because tlte person tions and bell rings typically occurred in tlte context of subjects' in tlte rebound period is doing the ~te of what the experimeaningful narratives about white bears.
menter requested in tlte suppression period, one might argue The observed effects have been examined in subsequent studthat reactance was aroused by the suppression task. By this ies varying several parameters of the experimental design. In logic, tlte experimenter's instruction to avoid thinking of a one such investigation, Shackelford, Wegner, and Schneider white bear restricted the subject's freedom to do so, and this (1987) arranged for three groups of 10 subjects each to particirestriction made the thought more attractive. Thus, the subject pate in experimental conditions like those of the initial supprestends to dwell on the thought in the suppression period, and sion group in this study. One group participated in an exact once given the freedom to return to tlte thought in the expresreplication, whereas the other groups participated with either sion period, becomes preoccupied with it. (a) no bell, and verbalization serving as the thought measure, or
The difficulty with this interpretation comes wilen ~ try to (b) no verbalization required. and the bell alone serving as tlte understand why a negative injunction should create more reacthought measure. The different metrics used in these groups tance than a positive one. After all, the subjects in the initial make mean comparisons between groups problematic, but the expression condition also had their freedom restricted; they zero-order correlation between thought tokens measured durwere told to think of a white bear. Reactance predicts that they ing suppression and subsequent expression was replicated for would avoid thinking of a white bear during the expression peall groups (each r < .07). These findings thus cast doubt on the riod, as they did (as compared with subjects in the expression possibility that the bell-ringing requirement in the original period of the initial suppression condition). But it would also study had any special influence on the occurrence of the repredict that initial expression subjects would be motivated to bound effect.
avoid the tltought during the subsequent suppression period One oilier follow-up study by Carter, Wegner, and Schneider and would do so more than the subjects in the initial suppres-(1987) is worth noting in that it showed what may be an imporsion condition. Such an effect should be of roughly the same tant limiting condition for the finding that ~le have trouble magnitude as the rebound phenomenon observed in the initial suppressing tltoughts. In this research, the tendency to report suppression condition. This did not happen. and the reactance thinking of tlte to-be-suppressed thought during the suppresexplanation thus falls short of a full explication of these findsion period was reliably reduced when subjects were given no ings. chance to practice verbalizing the stream of consciousness beAnother framework that could be applied here is self-percepfore they began the suppression task. It may be that subjects tion theory (Hem, 1972) . This th.eory does n,ot seem relevant to must be comfortable making such reports before they will adthe initial difficulty ~le have In sUppfCSSlng thoughts, but it mit to suppression difficulty, or perhaps the initial reporting does offer a prediction in line with some of the rebound evi- nitive change. All the things the person is thinking about during Design and procedure. The subjects ~ randomly assigned to three this task become associated with the negative cue. That is, the experimental conditions. Two of these ~ exact replications of the person comes to see present stimuli (e.g., the room, experiinitial expression and initial suppression conditions of Experiment I. menter, etc.) as well as thoughts retrieved from memory as re-
The third was identical to the initial suppression condition with one WEGNER. SCHNEIDER. CARTER. AND WHITE groups, n = 17 each. .~can vanatlon In the duration of white-bear thoughts acr~ conditions (F < I). By this measure, then, suppression in the three groups was ~erally equivalent.
exception: Subjects in this focused distraction condition ~ asked to
The mean .durati,:>n of thought about a red Vo~ in distract themselves during initial suppression by means of a single posithe fOCUsed-distraction condition was 20.7650 the equivalent of tive cue, the thought of a red Volkswagen. They ~ told after the sup-6.92 s per mention. This sUggests that subjects in this condition pression instruction, ..Also, if you do happen to think of a white bear. took seriously their task. of focusing on this diStracter. please try to think of a red Volkswagen instead." No further mention of Expression period. Thought occurrence during expression the red Volkswagen was made during the remainder of the experiment (as shown in Table 2 ) was significantly influenced by group, F(2, for these subjects.
46) = 4.62, p < .02. Newman-Keuls comparisons indicated that the initial suppression group mean was reliably greater Results than the mean for the initial expression group, p < .05. Thus, the general finding of a rebound effect in Experiment I was rep.. Analysis of the tape recordings was made for the same varilicated. (The temporal trends observed in that study, shown in abIes examined in the first study (bell rings occurring with men- Figure I , were not tested here as the result of the heterogeneity tions of a white bear, bell rings occurring alone, and mentions of error-variance problem. Inspection of means suggested that occurring alone), and in addition for (a) duration in seconds of the trend for increasing thought over time during expression in discussion about a white bear. (b) mentions of a red Volkswagen, the initial suppression group was not as pronounced as in the and (c) duration in seconds of discussion of a red Volkswagen. prior study.) The mean level of thought occurrence during exIntercoder reliability between a pair of coders averaged .96 for pression in the focused distraction group was significantly less the thought-occurrence measures (i.e., bells and mentions) and than the comparable mean in the initial suppression group (p < .86 for the thought-duration measures.
.05). This indicates that the rebound effect for thought occurAn initial attempt was made to use repeated measures ANrences was reliably reduced in the focused-distraction group. ov AS paralleling those of Experiment I. In that study, we were Thought duration during expression exhibited a marginally able to solve the problem of significant heterogeneity of error significant group effect. F(2, 46) = 3.0 I, p < .06. The differences variance in such analyses by the use of a square root data transbetween means reflected the same pattern as that observed for formation. The same transformation did not achieve homagethe thoUght-occurrence measure: The initial suppression group neity of error variance in this experiment, and all repeated meashowed a tendency toward a rebound effect. in that its level dursures analyses were therefore disallowed. With the square root ing expression was elevated over that of the initial expression transformation, however. homogeneity was obtained in threegroup; the focused-distraction group, in turn, showed a tengroup between-subjects ANOV As, and these were thus condency for the rebound to disappear, in that its level during exducted for each of two thought measures: an overall measure of pression resembled that of the initial expression group. thought occurrence and the measure of thought duration. Table Correia/ions within groups. As in the prior study, corre-2 shows raw scores for mean number of thought occurrences lations were calculated between thought-«currence scores for (sum of bell rings, mentions of a white bear. and bells with sisubjects in the expression and suppression periods. These cormultaneous mentions) and the mean thought duration in the relations revealed a pattern of individual variation consistent suppression and expression periods for each group.
with the prior study. Subjects' inclination to note thought ocSuppression period. As in Experiment I, subjects in this currences was significantly correlated between the expression study found suppression difficult. Across all conditions, suband suppression periods for subjects in the initial expression jects indicated thinking of a white bear 6.15 times in the 5-min group (r = .50, p < .02). This correlation was nonsignificant in suppression period. Subjects' preoccupation was significantly the initial suppression group (r = .23, p > .18). Although these greater in the initial suppression group than in the initial excorrelations are not reliably different, their relative magnitudes ..tions exhibited patterns of thinking largely indistinguishable A~ong subJ~.1n the focused-distractlon group during supfrom those of subjects in the initial expression group and sigpressIon, mentIoning a red Volkswagen tended to be correlated nificantly different from those of sub!J ' ects . n the.' tiaJ 0h 0 di . f 0 I 1m suppresWIt In catIons 0 whIte-bear thought OCCUrrence (r = ,4 I, P < sion group. .06). A ~al correlation taking into a.cc°unt the rela~on beThis is but a first outing for the negative-cuing hypothesis, of tween whIte-bear thought occurrences In the suppression and course, and further inquiry will be needed to detennine whether expressi.on conditio~s showed that ~entioning a red Volkswait serves as an adequate account of the rebound phenomenon. gen. dunng suppressIon was not reliably related to the level of
The hypothesis also predicts. for example, that the rebound whlt~-bear thought occurrence during subsequent expression might be eliminated by dissociating the contexts in which sup-(partial r = .33, ns). The negative-cuing hypothesis predicts a pression and expression are performed. People who try not to negative correlation here, but it is difficult to discern whether think about a white bear in one context would form negatively this finding represents an anomafy for the hypothesis or an effect cued associations to a white bear only in that context. On movof insufficient within-group sample size for statistical inference.
ing to a different context. their Constellation of ongoing thoughts would change, with far fewer thoughts now priming a white bear. and the rebound might be defeated. The relief from Discussion old worries one sometimes experiences on traveling to a new environment might be an example of this. The results of this study are consistent with those of ExperiFocused distraction also has its everyday equivalents. More ment 1 in suggesting that suppression is difficult and that it has than one person has attempted to find comfort in the face of reliable effects on subsequent thinking. The ability of subjects unwanted thoughts by appealing to a single distracter. be it a to suppress the thought of a white bear was not in strong evibare light bulb, a religious icon, or perhaps even a red Volkswadence here, as subjects tended to note the thought's occurrence gen. The results of this study suggest that there may be a certain more than once a minute even as they were attempting to supuse in turning to a familiar talisman in the pursuit of mental press it. This was true also among subjects given a focused dispeace. Although the distracter may not ease the current task traction, the instruction to think of a red Volkswagen whenever of suppression, it could block negative cuing and so serve the a white bear came to mind.
welcome purpose of reducing later resurgence of the suppressed The rebound phenomenon observed in Experiment I was thought. found in this study as well. Subjects who initially suppressed the white-bear thought and then were allowed to express it General Discussion showed an elevated tendency to report its occurrence during their expression ~portunity. Subjects in this initial suppression
The results of these experiments suggest that the portrayal of group, as it happened. also exhibited a significant elevation in suppression as the parent of obsession may contain a degree their degree of thought occurrence during suppression relative of truth. The process begins when a person attempts to put a to the other groups. and this finding raises the possibility that particular thought out of mind. This need not be an especially subjects in this group were merely more inclined to report obnoxious or unnerving thought-even the thought of a white thought occurrences than were subjects in the other groups. The bear will do. The person finds the thought hard to suppress and measure of thought duration, however. showed no such pattern, may soon wonder why this particular thought is so insistent. indicating instead a relative but nonsignificant lack of concern Continued suppression may eventually remove theo thought with the white bear during suppression for initial suppression from mind, for the present. Then, however. some remInder ocsubjects. Yet. by this measure, a marginally significant tendency curs. an? inoa moment of weakness the .~n gives license to toward a rebound was observed in the initial suppression group the rumination. Our results suggest that In this moment. an unduring the expression period. In addition, the correlation patusual preoccupation with the formerly suppressed th.oUght may tern between thought occurrences in the initial suppression and begin. This preoccupation may grow and prosper. In the perinitial expression groups paralleled the pattern of Experiment son's mind. And quite ironically, the person who IS first most Freud, 1914 Freud, /1958 , and alth.ough it is widely this point that the person becomes alarmed, noticing that an advocated m popular psychology channels, It has to date reunusual degree of preoccupation is underway. This might promained largely unformulated in psychological theory and unduce a newly energized attempt at suppression, only to restart supported in laboratory settings (e.g., Geen & Quanty, 1977) . the cycle. Suppression might be yet more difficult at this time, This picture of neglect and negative evidence is now changbut it could seem to be the only solution. Eventually, pathologiing, however, suggesting the beginnings of a new psychology of cal levels of obsessive concern could result. A similar analysis suppression. The work of Pennebaker ( 1985) is notable in this might be made of the processes of addiction. Attempts to conregard, showing in several field investigations that the supprestrol a habit such as smoking could take the form of thought sion or inhibition of emotional and cognitive reactions to trausuppression, and these in turn could prompt rebounds of excesmalic events may yield physiological changes and subsequent sive attention to the act of smoking. Cycles of suppression and health problems. A related line of inquiry by Silver, Boon, and preoccupation might then be standard fare for ~le who atStones (1983) suggests that suppression may block a natural tempt to control an addiction in this way, resulting in repetitive tendency to find meaning in traumatic events and that this can abstinence and relapse. hamper effective coping processes. These investigations focus On the practical side, then, perhaps it is fortunate that our on individuals responding in vivo to profound traumas, and alfindings signal at least one possibility for relief from the ironic though Pennebaker reported some success in the laboratory complications of thought suppression. Quite simply, it appears simulation of certain key aspects of this process, it is still true that when suppression is transformed into an active interest in that phenomena observed in vivid field demonstrations remain a single distracter, the longer term dangers of a rebounding preelusive in controlled settings. This may be one way in which the occupation with the suppressed thought may be prevented. Relaboratory paradigm can contribute. Our findings support the turning to a particular idea whenever one worries might provide general idea that suppression can backfire, and at the same time, some reduction in the eventual extent of the worrying. This prothe results make this point without recourse to the major emocedure might prove to be of some use in the elimination of obtional traumas usually associated with such effects (cf. Rachsessional thinking or addictive preoccupation. To be sure, howman, 1980). The suppression results we have observed suggest ever, the dimensions of this effect are only incompletely grasped a straightforward cognitive mechanism mirroring, and perhaps at this time, and the form of an adequate theory of successful underlying, a wide array of psychological phenomena: emosuppression is not imaginable yet. Much more needs to be tional, cognitive, and behavioral as well.
learned about the parameters ofth~ paradoxical effects we have It is yet an open question, of course, whether the suppression observed before we can suggest WIth any.confidence that they effects we have observed will generalize to items other than offer a proper analog of naturally OCCurrIng processes. In the white bears. The nature of the thought being suppressedmeantime, though, it seems clear that there is little to be gained whether it is emotional or not, easily imagined or not, familiar in trying not to think about it. or not, complex or not, and the like-would seem to be an important detertninant of suppression effects. The finding that an References item as unremarkable as a white bear can yield suppression problems, however, suggests that the effects are at least not tied Bem, D, J: (1972) . Self-perception theory. In L Berkowitz (Ed.), AIito any obvious stimulus qualities. Other points of concern for vances In exp~nmenlai SOCIal ps~hology (Vol. 6, pp. 1-62). New the validity of these findings center on the degree to which the York: Academic Press. 
